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influences of their profession, the importance of supplying this long-missing
element is manifest. The law of the new United States derived from two
sources - the more important being the principles developed in colonial prac-
tice, and the second being the English law. Men who found themselves faced
with the responsibility for striking off in new and unknown courses in the
process of state-making, would also be ready to advocate fresh turns of theory
for the law.
One looks forward with anticipation to the second volume of this masterful
study; and if the editor is to be pardoned, as well he might be, for grouping
the most dramatic documentary material in the first publication, there is con-
solation in the fact that Professor Goebel is also to be the author of the first
volume in the Supreme Court history earlier described. With as perceptive
a study of nascent Federal law as he has provided here for New York law,
the cause of legal history and the legal profession will have been admirably
served.
As a postscript - the present volume is superlatively printed.
WILLIAm F. SWINDLE*
STEEL DECISIONS AND THE NATIONAL ECONOMY. Yale Studies in Economics,
16. By Henry W. Broude.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963. Pp.
x, 332. $7.50.
WHAT originally was a promising, although somewhat pedantic, Ph.D. dis-
sertation, circa 1954, has been transformed into an essay that utilizes casual
empiricism and much irrelevant evidence to draw inferences that often seem
unjustified and to derive policy prescriptions that are not clearly warranted.1 In
part, this is due to Broude's attempt to weld a new superstructure on an old
keel. But, to a greater degree, it is caused by an incomplete implicit model of
firm and industry behavior and an over-reliance on attitudinal statements. Yet,
aside from its failure as an endeavor in economic analysis, and notwithstand-
ing spasms of prolixity and redundancy, the book, in some respects, might be
regarded as a success. It examines a matter that periodically has been of pub-
lic concern, contains some interesting information and bits of analysis, and
reads well.
*Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary.
*Professor of Economics, Yale University.
1. Interestingly, Broude never cites his thesis, although much of the material in the
volume has been taken directly from that earlier work, cf. Capital Goods Industry in the
Structure of a National Economy: An Example in Iron and Steel, unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, Harvard University, 1954.
2. The author's choice of the topic and his concentration on the steel industry appear
to have been stimulated by the controversy engendered by President Truman's 1949 recom-
mendation that the government intervene to eliminate shortages and assure adequate steel-
making capacity. State of the Union Message to the Congress of the United States, January
5, 1949.
As several economists have observed, however, if recent tendencies continue, steel may
well be the textiles of the next few decades, i.e., an industry plagued by excess capacity,
high unemployment, and low profitability.
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Broude is worried about the problem of resolving gaps between "public"
appraisal of requisite capacity in an industry and capacity forthcoming from pri-
vate responses to market forces. While no general treatment of this subject is
presented, the iron and steel industry is examined as a case study. The parti-
cular questions to which Broude addresses himself are:
1. Is the industry so strategically "placed" in the structure of the national
economy that actions within it have pivotal significance to the well-being
of the economy; and
2. What policies, if any, can and should be instituted to affect behavior
and performance in the industry?
The approach taken in the examination of these issues is threefold: (1) a
review of the historical association between steel output and gross national
product (in Chapter II) and of the relationship of steel demand and capacity
requirements (Chapter IV) ; (2) the formulation of a simplified model of the
role of the industry in the course of economic change (Chapter III); and (3)
interviews with and compilation of published statements of industry leaders
to ascertain factors in entrepreneurial decisions (Chapter V). There then fol-
lows a concluding chapter which proposes national economic policies to obtain
socially desired steel industry capacity.
Broude discovered that, in terms of turning points and secular trend, the
relationship between steel production and GNP is almost fixed; from 1919 to
1950 constant dollar GNP grew at 3.2 percent per year while steel output rose
at 3 percent per year. Furthermore (and not surprisingly), there was an even
closer correspondence between steel output and investment activity in the
economy. These trends (and deviations from trends) were examined in some
detail, and it was concluded that, because of the high variability of the ampli-
tude of the relationships and occasional lapses from consistent timing, steel
output series are not useful iidicators or forecasters of levels of business ac-
tivity.3
Broude's Chapter III is misplaced; it is discussed below. In Chapter M he
examines several major previous attempts, particularly that of Dunn, to deter-
mine capacity requirements for the industry.4 Dunn made the valuable obser-
vation that, even in physical (in contrast to economic) terms, the concept of
capacity is ambiguous. Capacity might be defined as: (1) the instantaneous
maximum output attainable if all facilities were utilized to the fullest extent;
(2) the output attainable under normal operating conditions with normal
"down time" taken into account - called "rated capacity" (the concept em-
ployed in the industry's trade association reports) ; or (3) the output attain-
able under high demand pressure with less than normal "down time" - "re-
liable capacity." In terms of long-run capacity adequacy, the second concept
3. The timing is generally coincident. Broude, mipra note 1, at 59-60.
4. DuNN, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE ADEQUACY OF
THE STEEL INDUSTRY FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE (Office of Production Management, Feb-
ruary 22, 1941).
1965]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
appears to be valid; for investigating short-run bottleneck phenomena, the
reliable capacity definition may be the most reasonable5
While these concepts are exposited in depth, no use is made of them; the
author merely continues on to report on other demand and production require-
ment studies.6 Finally, the static Leontief interindustry model (complemented
by an output-capacity vector) is proposed for use in demand prediction, and
summary results of the 1953 U.S. Office of Business Economics input-output
steel requirements study are presented.7
Surprisingly, "in order to allow evaluation of the relative 'realism' of the
foregoing (interindustry) approach as applied to the steel industry," Broude
next turns to "a consideration of some aspects of entrepreneurial behavior in
the industry." He first briefly sketches the organizational history of U.S. Steel,
Bethlehem, and Inland, and then passes to the decision-making framework.
Because the number of factors which might be evaluated in expansion plan-
ning is extensive, Broude limits himself to matters of timing, thereby neglect-
ing the determinants of expenditures. He proposes to investigate whether de-
cisions to expand steel capacity occur in the midst of or in anticipation of a
change in the demand for steel. It is found (from company publications) that
firms in the industry base estimates of more immediate demand on patterns
of current and expected production of major steel consumers, but that ques-
tions of the longer-run future are examined before decisions to meet short-run
expected rises in sales are made.8 As Broude observes, such forecasts must,
of course, give weight to product mix and regional factors, and, in an individual
firm, its own and its rivals' sales penetration strategy. The subsequent logical
steps are to see whether facilities in existence and under construction will be
adequate to meet anticipated demand, and to plan revisions in the capital bud-
get consistent with the firm's objectives. However, practically no quantitative
evidence on the timing of investment in relation to changes in demand is pre-
sented, and that which is, is not clear-cut.0
5. Obviously, in an integrated production process, a bottleneck in any segment can
seriously retard final output. Unless they are frequent, stochastic occurrences of this nature
must be neglected in preparing capacity estimates; longer-run shortages automatically
should alter these figures.
There is also a need to be aware of the effect on steel capacity of varying the quality
of input raw materials. The difference in blast furnace capacity of using high instead of
low grade iron ores can be as much as 20 percent.
6. There is also a long digression on the 1950 proposal to erect a steel works in the
New England region.
7. U.S. DEPFT Coam isRCE, OFFICE OF Busxxss ECONOMICS, INVESTMENT COSr AND
CAPACITY IN IRON AND STEEL: AN EXPLORAToRY STUDY (Sept. 1953).
8. Pp. 179-80.
9. Some fragmentary Inland Steel data reveal an apparent one to two year lead of
output to net additions to property.
Delivery time data published in Iron Age and Department of Conunerce on new orders,
unfilled orders, shipments, and inventory statistics could also have been utilized. Relating
these data to investment appropriations (available from the National Industrial Confer-
-ence Board) and outlays might have given Broude clues to the timing of investment
relative to changes in demand.
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Broude's next move is an investigation of managerial objectives and moti-
vations for capacity additions. After first rejecting the influence of interest
rates on investment and discarding profit maximization, the author looks at
the decision-maker in the role of an "economic actor," pursuing perceived goals
of security, continuity, growth, prestige, and power of the firm, identification
with the firm, social approbation, and participation in an "absorbing game."' 0
In order to gain insights on behavior four open-ended interviews were con-
ducted with chief executives or directors of steel corporations. The companies
and dates of the interviews are, unfortunately, not given; the questions asked
centered on predictions of future capacity expansion and industry output,
future types of industry personnel, implications of future government inter-
ference, and industry structure vis-i-vis monopoly and competition. The an-
swers revealed little of interest, except perhaps some concern about financing
and the inadequacy of allowable tax depreciation charges.
Next a content analysis of 45 statements of steel executives between May
1931 and December 1952 is presented to ascertain whether a new capacity
expansion attitude developed in the industry after 1950. Given the selection of
the initial depression period and ending on peak Korean demand, and the
structuring of the data, it would be startling if the industry's attitude were not
more optimistic about expansion in the later years. Nothing much can be drawn
from the content analysis as it was executed, or from the following discussion
of expansion, new technology, and foreign competition (except that the U.S.
has been lagging behind foreign producers), or from the mystical characteriza-
tion of the "representative entrepreneur."
Returning now to the misplaced Chapter III and the role of the steel industry
in the course of economic change, first, it can readily be shown, although
Broude does so laboriously, that the rate of increase of steel demand depends
on the aggregate marginal and average capital-output ratios in the economy
(and the steel intensity of the capital stock) and will be less than the rate of
increase of GNP if these parameters are constant. An acceleration or decelera-
tion of GNP will normally have the opposite effect."' Secondly, as to cyclical
leverage phenomena, it is inconceivable (except through demonstration effects
inducing parallel action in other sectors) that the industry acting independently
could prevent a downturn of the economy at the upper turning point of a cycle
by increasing its investment from normal levels. Broude uses an arbitrary
multiplier-accelerator model to show this, but merely noting the industry's
average share of total business investment (about 3-4 percent) would have
been sufficient. This is aside from correct anticipation of the turning point with
a sufficient lead time so that appropriate capital additions could be planned
and the expenditures undertaken.
10. While these may be ultimate forces underlying executive behavior (just as the
desire for satisfactions underlies personal consumption behavior), it seems quite dubious
to this reviewer that such motives are the determinants of particular capacity expansion
decisions. I, for one, am unwilling to abandon the e.xplanation of economic phenomena to
the psychoanalysts couch.
11. Both statements presuppose realistic values of the parameters.
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Finally, although the objective of the book is to examine and prescribe
policies to assure "adequate" steel capacity, only nine pages are devoted direct-
ly to the analysis of bottleneck phenomena. The fact that inadequacy of supply
of a primary input such as steel can play a significant part in bringing on a
downturn is obvious. 12 Broude demonstrates that 'such is the case by a clever
introduction of bottlenecks into Goodwin's diagrammatic accelerator model
(driven by income and discrepancies between desired and actual capital stock).
Investment responses to income are assumed, as are feedbacks on income as a
result of new capital formation."3 The model clearly reveals that "a bottleneck
condition could precipitate a downturn sooner than would have been expected,
or conversely could shorten the period of expansion in that phase of the
cycle." 14 It might be added that the amplitude of cycles would be decreased
while their frequency would rise.
Having shown that bottlenecks could cause recessions, Broude devotes the
final chapter of his book to national economic policy for "ideal" functioning of
the industry.
The psychological motivations and public forces on steel management are
first re-examined and then several alternative "social control measures" are
presented. These range from extreme moves to increase and enforce competi-
tion (e.g., by strong anti-trust policies or dissolution to form firms of a maxi-
mum size of one integrated works) to maximizing control over operations
(e.g., by public utility regulation or government ownership). Other inter-
mediate measures take the form of "carrot" incentives (e.g., accelerated amor-
tization, tax credits, government loans) or indirect coercion (e.g., through the
government's buying power, competition with the industry of the TVA variety,
control by admonition). All of these have distinct disadvantages, to varying
degrees, in terms of interference with the market mechanism, discrimination
between and among existing firms and potential entrants, creation of inflation-
ary pressures, and so forth.
Except to the extent of keeping entry conditions as open as possible and
opposing mergers, Broude rejects the extreme measures, cx cathedra, as
"'neither economically, politically, nor administratively feasible or desirable."
Taken together with loan and tax incentive measures, some features which
normally would be a part of regulatory policy form the basis for Broude's
recommendations. He proposes the establishment of a review body responsible
to the Joint Economic Committee, which would work with the projections of
GNP prepared by the Council of Economic Advisers and break them down to
provide estimates of aggregate national capacity and product mix required of
12. As Duesenberry notes, it is, however, unlikely that such shortages can cause major
depressions. DUESENBERRY, BUSINESS CYCLES AND EcoNoMIc GROWH 280-81 (1958).
13. Whether investment responses are brought about by subsidiary changes in output
prices, profits, the cost of capital goods, or directly via income changes is irrelevant, if the




the industry. These forecasts would then be the subject of public hearings
held in conjunction with those on the President's economic report and would
be put into the Congressional Record as a set of targets against which the in-
dustry as well as the society might judge the industry's performance. In the
suggested public review, the burden-of-proof is to be placed on the industry
to show cause why it is unable, or unwilling, to meet the government's capacity
targets.' 5 Small firms would be exempted from the procedure which would
endeavor, after any revisions of desired capacity decided upon as a result of
the hearings, to obtain compliance by admonition, preferential tax treatment
and purchasing, and other rewards and penalties. The advantage of this type
of social control (as claimed by the author) is that it replaces the present
"erratic, capriciously applied, ad hoc" admonitions and procedures with a for-
mal mechanism that establishes overt standards. Yet, the disadvantages (ignor-
ed by Broude) are numerous - a matter to which I shall return after pre-
senting some reservations to the capacity adequacy analysis.
First, findings based on the relationship between steel production and GNP
or investment imply little, of course, about the causal role played by the steel
industry in influencing aggregate cyclical movements and growth. It would be
a simple economic world, indeed, that depended solely on steel output to deter-
mine its expansion path. A complex of forces is involved, of which steel is only
one factor, i.e., the availability of steel is a necessary but not a sufficient con-
dition for growth and stability. Moreover, it may be inappropriate to draw in-
ferences from long annual time series, since the short-run effects of normal
peacetime shortages of steel might be felt only near particular peaks of certain
cycles. 6
Second, there are several difficulties with the interindustry approach for de-
mand forecasting.
a. The use of input-output coefficients only yields exact estimates of steel
needs if the final demands on the major steel consuming industries (on both
a direct and indirect basis) have been precisely specified. As the forecast period
is lengthened, such detailed specifications become more and more uncertain,
causing a corresponding variability in the accuracy of prediction of steel de-
mands. Moreover, even in the short run, large predictive errors may be en-
countered because changes in inventory accumulation by steel consumers can-
not readily be fully anticipated.
b. In the long run, input coeffiicents are not likely to remain constant, since
they are altered by technological change, competitive market conditions, and
relative price substitution effects. There is no presumption that the entire
matrix of input coefficients will be so altered over time by technical progress
and revised profit margins that steel requirements per dollar of final demand
15. These are to be devised so as to "assure adequate capacity at all ltines" (emphasis
added). Obviously, the price of such sufficiency is excess capacity, which Broude views
not as a net social cost, but as standby capacity that yields a net positive social return.
Pp. 305-07.
16. The matter of secular shortages in steel capacity will be treated subsequently.
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will remain constant. Although substitution may never be complete, the long
run elasticity to relative price shifts can be large, causing substantial displace-
ment by one input for another. To cite one example, prestressed concrete has
been widely substituted for steel in much building construction. In certain
uses, over long periods of time, particular materials do frequently retain marked
cost advantages, giving rise to so-called "thresholds of substitution." Yet, if
all uses and total production of an industry are considered, marginal substitu-
tion in many uses can sum to a substantial loss in volume.
c. The relevant capacity requirements coefficients must be of a marginal
nature, stating the capacity increments needed to satisfy additional demand.
Moreover, in order to avoid bottlenecks, they must be highly disaggregated
to account for the specialized, as well as the interdependent, capacity needs of
different product mixes. This represents a formidable problem, since a large
number of mixes are bound to be encountered. For industry capacity require-
ments forecasts, variations in production methods between plants or firms
manufacturing identical products may also be important; significant interfirm
capital input coefficient differences, even where the production process basically
is the same, have been observed. Additionally, the regional pattern in demand
may markedly influence capacity adequacy - West Coast steel requirements
cannot economically (due to transport costs) be satisfied by production in
Pittsburgh.
d. For short-run purposes, use of the interindustry technique is bedeviled
by the need to adjust for inventory stocks on hand and inventory responses
and technical and human inertial lags to fluctuating demand and capacity pres.
sures.
Nonetheless, all of these problems are not so severe as to invalidate the
general approach. In fact, the interindustry methodology probably has more
promise than other alternatives for preparing accurate forecasts. However,
modifications of the input and capacity coefficients are definitely required for
longer-run projections, and even in the short-run, cyclical adjustments might
be needed. Therefore, analysis of time series aggregates might be viewed in a
complementary rather than competitive role, being employed as a guide, with
other evidence to potential shifts in input factors.17
Third, the timing and amounts of investment outlays are inextricably inter-
woven and cannot be analyzed separately. It cannot be assumed that capacity
which might be warranted by future demand can, willy-nilly, be stuffed into
the present to meet current needs. The timing of capacity increments does
affect and in turn is influenced by costs, the availability of funds, rates of re-
turn and pricing. These factors should not blissfully be set aside or swept
under the twin rugs of ignorance or ceteris paribus.
Fourth, while Broude's elegant demonstration of the theoretical impact of
bottlenecks is commendable, in the light of the policy formulation intent of




the author, it is far from adequate. The more important questions to be an-
swered are:
1. Have peacetime steel bottlenecks in fact existed in the recent past;
2. If so, what was their nature, extent, and effect on the economy; and
3. Are they likely to recur and have serious deleterious consequences?
Only after a response has been offered to these queries can policy for govern-
ment intervention validly be formulated.
TABLE I
PRODUCTION AND CAPACrIY UTIMiZATION
IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY
1947-1960
Federal Reserve Board Index of Percent of Rated
Iron and Steel Production* Capacity Utilizationt
1957-59 - 100
Blast Furnaces Steel Mill Blast Steel
and Steel Works Products Furnaces Furnaces
1939 na. nra. 62.8 64.5
1947 89.7 90.5 90.3 64.5
1948 93.5 94.6 90.5 94.1
1949 81.6 83.4 76.8 81.3
1950 100.2 103.6 91.4 96.8
1951 109.9 1132 98.3 100.9
1952 96.6 97.6 842 85.8
1953 115.4 115.0 95.6 94.9
1954 90.1 90.6 71.6 71.0
1955 119.4 121.5 92.6 93.0
1956 117.2 119.5 88.9 89.9
1957 116.9 114.7 91.4 84.5
1958 87.3 85.8 63.5 60.6
1959 95.9 99.6 64.3 63.3
1960 101.3 102.3 69.7 66.8
1961 99.3 95.3 nma. n.a.
n.a. - not available.
*U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Industrial Production: 1957-
59 Base, Washington, pp. 569-70.
tAmerican Iron and Steel Institute, Annual Statistical Report, various years.
Consider short-run bottlenecks. If the demand for steel truly is price inelas-
tic, then capacity utilization and production statistics should reveal bottlenecks
at cyclical peaks. It can be seen in Table I that in the pre-recession peaks o1
1948, 1953, 1957 and 1960, production and capacity utilization were somewhat
greater than in the preceding years. Yet in each of these instances rated capac-
ity utilization was less than 100 percent and reliable capacity utilization (the
more relevant concept - cf. above) would have been even lower.18
18. There have been postwar monthly and quarterly periods when the utilization rate
(not seasonally adjusted) approached or exceeded 100%. With the exception of 1948:4-
1949:1 and the Korean years, these occurred in the quarters immediately preceding and
following steel strikes. Also, when steel inventories are taken into account and production
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The examination of the 1955 experience is also interesting. Capacity utiliza-
tion was lower than during the Korean conflict, yet production reached its post-
war peak in this year. It is dubious whether the 1955 automobile or the 1956
producer's durable equipment booms were restricted by a steel shortage.10 As
to the postwar recessions themselves, Hickman's careful study revealed no in-
dication that an unavailability of steel played any role in these downturns; the
recessions were all ascribed to other sources. 20
Nevertheless, it might be proposed, due to price movements, that this is more
apparent than real. If strong demand or cost-push pressures on steel caused
sharp steel price rises, and these were then "passed on" to final consumers,
aggregate demand (in real terms) might fall. While under the "pass on" as-
sumption the relative percentage rise caused in other prices by steel price in-
creases is significant, the absolute dollar magnitude of the rise would be small
in the short run. For example, a substantial rise, say 10 percent, in the price
of steel would (if just "passed on") cause a .7-2.3 percent increase in the price
of motor vehicles; translated into absolute terms and 1964 prices, this would
mean the average car would be approximately $15-$50 more expensive.-" From
a cyclical standpoint it is dubious that this would have much direct short-run
impact. 22 Relaxation of the price elasticity assumption, i.e., marked substitu-
tions of one type of expenditure for another, would tend to lessen any demand
and output diminution as long as other sectors have adequate capacity to satis-
fy such shifts.
The same is true in the long run, but one cannot blithely assume as Broude
does (p. 273 - however, he later contradicts himself on p. 306) that the specific
is seasonally adjusted, any scarcity impact of brief high utilization is minimized. On the
other hand, this might be offset to some extent by regional mismatching of capacity, in-
ventories, and demand.
19. As emphasized earlier, this review of capacity utilization should be conducted by
type of product (e.g., cold rolled sheet) and region of demand and production. (Shipment
and capacity data available in Iron Age and from the American Iron and Steel Institute
might be valuable in this regard.) However, trade reports at the time or T. A. Wilson's,
"An Analysis of the Inflation in Machinery Prices," Study of Employment, Growltih and
Price Levels, U.S. Joint Economic Committee, November 1959, do not cite any steel short-
ages. Moreover, higher utilization rates generally result in greater profitability (c/. Eel:-
stein & Fromm, "Steel and the Postwar Inflation," id. at 25-26). In other words, steel pro-
ducers are faced with incentives to increase and not lessen utilization.
Broude might counter with the argument that, by 1955, steel executives' "new attitudes"
had assured sufficient capacity. If so, then there are unlikely to be any short-run bottle-
necks in the immediate future.
20. HIcKMAN, GROWTH AND STABILITY OF THE POSTWAR ECONOMY (1960).
21. These weights are taken from the 1947 Evans and Hoffenberg input-output table
(Review of Economics and Statistics, May 1952). The upper limit contains both direct
and indirect effects of a steel price increase (including the cost of investment goods by the
motor vehicle industry) and, therefore, should be regarded as the long-term limit of the
price effect.
22. During an upswing in aggregate economic activity, there could be concern, of
course, about the inflationary pressures generated by demonstration effects. These might lit
turn increase the savings rate to produce deflationary forces. Cf. Tyrni, "The Effect of
Price Changes on Consumer Saving," Review of Economic Studies, April 1964.
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scarcity problem vanishes (in the long run) either through relief of the scarcity
or through adjustment via substitution in the production process or the prod-
ucts demanded. Given the highly concentrated oligopoly structure of the indus-
try (even without excessive profits), prices would tend to be higher and output
lower than under more competitive conditions.2 If substitution is imperfect,
then aggregate output will be retarded from otherwise attainable levels.24 Such
gaps can be sizable and, if they persist over an extended period, entail a sizable
diminution in potential welfare. Government intervention to secure adequate
capacity might then be desirable.
If undertaken for this reason or in response to cyclical bottleneck problems,
it is still questionable, however, whether interference with the market mech-
anism should take the form advocated by Broude. The consequences of gov-
ernment dictation of capacity changes may involve not only the loss of psycho-
logical freedom of managers to determine their firms' actions (which may be
relatively unimportant), but might also give rise to substantial waste and in-
efficiency. Enforced capacity standards (if they are not to induce expansion by
high cost producers or in areas where demand already is being satisfied) can-
not be set forth in a general sense; they must be for specific kinds of capacity,
in specific regions, to supply specific types of steel for specific classes of users.
Aside from accurately predicting demand, a myriad of dynamic factors must be
taken into account in these specifications - evolving technology; changing
sources, qualities, and costs of raw materials; shifting relative prices of com-
petitive substitutes for steel; and so forth. Furthermore, the decision to satisfy
demand (at given prices) entails knowledge that steel production and trans-
portation costs are sufficiently low (in the absence of explicit or implicit sub-
sidies) for reasonable after-tax profits to be earned on investment. Almost in-
evitably, as has been demonstrated in other regulated industries (especially
transportation), the control of capacity leads to the imposition of constraints
on pricing2 5
Moreover, in the case of steel, this is a virtual certainty. Given the substan-
tial long-run direct and short-run demonstration impact of steel prices on other
prices in the economy and the present-day concern about inflation, the indus-
try's prices would soon be regulated after capacity reviews had been instituted.
In theory, pricing control may not be harmful; in practice, it is sure to lead
to distortions of prices from the real costs of resources.
23. Economies of scale are not required for this conclusion. Furthermore, it is valid
for both static and dynamic cases. Incidentally, for the shift in demand-constant returns to
scale case, Broude rediscovers that a monopoly or oligopoly firm will attempt to maximize
output at the pre-existing price if it had been at a profit maximizing equilibrium prior to
the change.
24. This assumes that imports of steel or production of steel by firms not in the in-
dustry (e.g., automobile manufacturers) also are inadequate to eliminate any long-run
scarcity. Obviously, transport or production cost or some other type of barrier is required
for this to be true.
25. In many respects, Broude's proposal is similar to the techniques employed in
France, where capacity and price regulation are not uncommonly tied to one another.
unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, to be submitted in late 1964.
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The establishment of capacity standards might also lead to misallocation of
resources. The nature of the review procedure suggested by Broude leaves
ample room for the exertion of effective political pressures by congressmen
seeking to have production facilities or contracts awarded to firms in their dis-
tricts. Surely, the long history of the undesirable effects of the "pork barrel"
is a cause for concern in giving Congress the power to geographically dis-
tribute employment in the industry. Even if the process could be insulated from
political forces, there still is no guarantee that government experts on the re-
view board would choose economically ideal locations for new capacity. Cer-
tainly the government's selection of Fontana, California (60 miles inland), and
Dangerfield, Texas, as steel production centers in the early 1940's (even tak-
ing account of the military situation at the time) is not reassuring in that re-
gard.2 6
Other difficulties with regulation (including retarding effects on technolog-
ical progress) might also be cited. Taking all these disadvantages into account,
there is sufficient room for skepticism about the efficacy of utilizing a capacity
review board to achieve socially desired behavior of the industry to urge that
other alternatives be considered and carefully investigated. Efforts to obtain a
less concentrated industry structure and more competitive market actions un-
der the Sherman and Clayton Acts should not lightly be dismissed in favor of
far more easily implemented, but potentially more harmful, regulation, what-
ever its form. This is all the more true because Broude has not demonstrated
that the steel industry has or will retard the economy; in this light, his recom
mendations for control must at the least be regarded as unfortunate, if not
capricious and irresponsible.
GARY FRommt
JAUIRBUCH DES OFFENTLICHEN RECHTS DER GEGENWART (Neue Folge). Ed-
ited by Gerhard Leibholz. Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Volume
I (1951) pp. xv-941; volume 2 (1953) pp. viii-300; volume 3 (1954)
pp. lv-397; volume 4 (1955) pp. iii-415; volume 5 (1956) pp. iii-365;
volume 6 (1957) pp. iii-404; volume 7 (1958) pp. iv-400; volume 8 (1959)
pp. iv-482; volume 9 (1960) pp. iii-480; volume 10 (1961) pp. iv-549;
volume 11 (1962) pp. iv-481; volume 12 (1963) pp. iv-511.
The Jahrbuch has a distinguished tradition. Founded in 1906 as a forum
for description and analysis of public law problems from the comparative view,
the annual has provided a useful and reliable measurement of the evolution
of constitutional and administrative law in many countries. Publication of the
Jahrbuch was discontinued in 1939, but since 1951, with the appearance of
26. Cf. Trozzo, Locational Inefficiency: The Case of Basic Steel Production Centers,
tThe Brookings Institution.
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